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van Oorschot, W.J.H.

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Wim van Oorschot

WORC
Work and Organization Research Centre

SHARED IDENTITY AND SHARED UTILITY

ON SOLIDARITY AND ITS MOTIVES

Wim van Oorschot
Tilburg Institute for Social Security Research
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Abstract
To understand the puzzle of the European public's preference for collectivistic and solidaristic welfare state arrangements against the European-wide policy trend of increasing welfare conditionality and selectivity, a first requirement it is to have a clear understanding and definition of the sociological concept of solidarity and what types of motive people may have to support solidarity ties. This paper discusses the views on solidarity of a number of classical and modern sociologists. The conclusion will be that solidarity can be defined as an actual state of interrelations between individuals, groups and the larger society, which enables the collective interest to take priority over the interests of individuals or sub-collectivities. Another conclusion will be that such a state basically rests upon either a shared identity ('we are one') or a shared utility ('we need each other'). This implies that the strength and range of a system's solidarity is a function of the nearness and dependence among the social actors it embraces, which in turn leads to arguing that people can have four different motives to support an actual state or relation of solidarity: (1) mutual affection and identification; (2) moral convictions; (3) (long-term) self interest; (4) accepted coercion.

1. Introduction

Welfare states are under reconstruction throughout. In Western industrialised countries initially due to the economic and fiscal crisis of the late 1970s early 1980s, which urged for cutbacks on social expenditures. In Eastern European countries due to the political turnover, which urged for re-designing social policies and institutions. A number of recent comparative welfare state studies show that national reconstruction processes share some common tendencies (see e.g. George and Taylor-Gooby 1996, Ploug and Kvist 1996, Daly 1997). In many countries access to universal protection schemes has been limited, solidarity ties in social insurances between good and bad risks and higher and lower incomes have been reduced, the role of means-testing has increased, welfare to work strategies are implemented, as well as more stringent definitions of unemployment and disability. With these measures the collectively organised social protection of citizens has become less universal, more selective and conditional in many European countries, while the role of privately organised protection, with its strict conditionality related to the logic of private insurance, is increasing. This new conditionality, which emphasises citizens' responsibilities more than citizens' rights, manifests that the answer of policy-makers to the crucial welfare question of 'who should get what, and why' has changed drastically. For certain needy citizens (like young unemployed, single parents, partially disabled) it is not as easy anymore to benefit from society's solidarity, i.e. to get the status of 'deserving of support', as it was in the West during the prosperous 1970s or in the East under socialist ideology.

While the policy trend of a decreasing collective solidarity and an increasing conditional and selective rationing of welfare is clear, there seems to be a puzzle with regard to its societal legitimacy. On the one hand it looks as if the public at large agrees with the restricted welfare solidarity, since the reconstruction measures generally do not seem to meet open and strong societal resistance. Experts do warn against certain measures, interest groups raise their voice from time to time, but nowhere in Europe does the process of reconstruction lead to overt and fierce social conflicts. On the other hand, however, there is the fact that in opinion surveys the European public repeatedly

expresses its general preference for broad and collective welfare state arrangements (see e.g. Ferrera 1993, Ploug 1996, Van Oorschot 1997a, Abrahamson 1997). Understanding this puzzle seems to be crucial for understanding the future of European welfare states, since it would show whether 'the new conditionality' has a societal legitimacy base or not, and on what values, attitudes and perceptions it is precisely grounded. At the moment, however, it is not possible to analyse it directly. Firstly, the detailed data that would be required on the public's opinions on solidaristic and universal versus conditional and selective welfare policies are not available at present. Existing international comparative surveys, like the International Social Justice Project, the European and World Values Surveys, the International Social Survey Programme and the Eurobarometers do tap relevant welfare state values and opinions, but at a too general and superficial level. Secondly, there is a theoretical problem, in the sense that a clear understanding of the concept of solidarity is lacking, as well as a systematic account of why people would be willing to support collective and solidaristic welfare arrangements or not.

As a step towards solving the puzzle this paper focuses on the theoretical deficiency mentioned. It aims to develop and present an understanding and definition of the sociological concept of solidarity, and it will analyse why people are willing to support solidaristic relations and arrangements. As a starting point we examine theories on solidarity from Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Mayhew and Hechter. These sociologists perceive of solidarity as a characteristic of a social system, not as a belief or a feeling held by individual people. The conclusion will be that solidarity can be defined as an actual state of interrelations between individuals, groups and the larger society, which enables the common good of groups and society to be served. Another conclusion will be that such a state basically rests upon either a shared identity ('we are one') or a shared utility ('we need each other'). This implies that the strength and range of a system's solidarity is a function of the nearness and dependence among the social actors it embraces, which in turn leads us to argue that people can have four different motives to support an actual state or relation of solidarity: (1) mutual affection and identification; (2) moral convictions; (3) (long-term) self interest; (4) accepted coercion.

2. Sociologists on solidarity

Mechanic and organic solidarity

Emile Durkheim perceived solidarity, positively stated, as that which binds individuals into a relatively autonomous society, or negatively stated, that which prevents the disintegration of a society (Luhman 1982). Durkheim briefly formulated the two main sources for social solidarity he identified as: '*...the likeness of consciences and the division of social labour*' (Durkheim, 1966/1893: 226). 'Likeness of consciences' refers to a situation in which individuals share the same fundamental cultural elements, which they use as a basis for recognising and accepting each other as members of the same collectivity. On these grounds such individuals can empathise with one another, become interested on each other's behalf and form a solidaristic whole. In such a situation of mechanic solidarity the individual identifies strongly with the group. The strong sense of 'we' leaves little space for individuality. This type of culturally-based mutual bond

implies that group interests can prevail over the interests of the individuals involved. The second source of solidarity lies in the division of labour, which causes people to become mutually dependent on each other for their life opportunities. The division of labour thus gives rise to structural bonds. According to Durkheim the structural interdependence in a modern and complex society needs to be acknowledged and actively regulated to function properly. Modern, complex, organic solidarity has to be organised by means of rules for co-operation which force the individual '*...to act in view of ends which are not strictly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compromises, to take into account interests higher than his own*' (Durkheim, 1966/1893: 227). In other words, organic solidarity presupposes explicitly that individuals allow collective interests to prevail over their own. The coercion accompanying the rules for co-operation, however, need not be experienced by individuals as an unpleasant burden that they are inclined to resist. Like any institutional obligation, these rules can be internalised during the socialisation process. Acting in accordance with the obligations of society and contributing to the common good will then be seen and experienced as an intrinsic moral duty, not as externally enforced behaviour.

Durkheim saw the cultural bond as at the heart of 'mechanic' solidarity, dominant in homogeneous pre-modern societies, and the structural interdependence as central to 'organic' solidarity, which tends to bind modern societies with a highly differentiated division of labour. Durkheim emphasises the functional necessity of solidarity for the existence and survival of social systems. Especially cultural and structural ties between actors within the system enable the interests of the collectivity itself to be served. Such interests transcend the interests of individual actors and can even conflict with them. A social system with insufficient solidarity where the cultural and structural ties are too few or too weak is bound to disintegrate, simply because its overarching interests will not be served adequately (see also Parsons, 1951: 96).

Furthermore, Durkheim regards solidarity as a characteristic of a social system. The existence and survival of a collectivity depend on the de facto cultural and structural interrelatedness within its boundaries and not on the feelings of solidarity which actors may have towards each other. Admittedly, such feelings are somewhat relevant to solidarity. The solidarity ties actually present in society have to be accepted and supported by the people and groups involved. While feelings may play a role in this acceptance and support we will see later on that other motives are possible too.

Communal and associative relationships

While Durkheim analyses solidarity from a macro point of view by perceiving it as a characteristic of broader collectivities and societies, Max Weber approaches the subject from a micro point of view. According to Weber solidarity characterises social relations between individuals (Weber 1964 [1922]: 136-139).

Social relations, Weber argues, are solidary (*solidär*) if they are directed at interests that transcend those of the individuals involved and as such establish a bond between them. Referring to Tönnies' well known dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft,* Weber identifies two types of solidary relations, which bear a remarkable resemblance to Durkheim's concepts of mechanic and organic solidarity. First there is *Vergemeinschaftung*, translated by Henderson and Parsons as 'communal relationship', in

which case individuals treat each other according to fellow feeling, a subjective feeling of belonging together. According to Weber, such a feeling can have affective, emotional and traditional bases. Examples include a religious brotherhood, an erotic relationship, a relation of personal loyalty, a national community and 'esprit de corps'. The core of the communal relation lies in a shared we-ness, in the understanding and acceptance that one is a member of the same group. Here Weber formulates the micro version of Durkheim's mechanic solidarity. Second, there is *Vergesellschaftung*, translated as 'associative relationship', in which case people treat each other according to a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement. The essence of the associative relationship is that it is 'utility directed'. That is, it is aimed at a certain material or non-material utility which is of interest to both actors. Durkheim's organic solidarity, which is derived from an interdependence of life opportunities, is easily recognisable in this second type of solidary relationship.

Weber argues that both types can be present in one and the same relationship. For instance, within family relations there is a we-feeling (communal) but usually also (sometimes only after heavy bargaining) rational agreement on the best way to deal with each member's personal interests and those of the family as a whole. Furthermore, according to Weber communal solidarity should not necessarily be associated with harmony and voluntariness. On the contrary, conflict and coercion in communal relations, even in the most intimate ones, is not uncommon. Third, solidarity is not the same as equality or homogeneity. This means that extensive sharing does not suffice to establish a communal bond. Explicit fellow-feeling is at the heart of such solidarity, rather than mere commonness in modes of behaviour, situation or qualities.[1] To illustrate his point, Weber submits that two members of the same race do not necessarily have a communal relationship. They achieve this state only when they treat each other on the basis of a sense of we-ness.

Sources of solidarity: shared identity and shared utility

At this stage we can conclude from Durkheim and Weber that both perceive solidarity as a characteristic of social relations, at the macro level as well as at the micro level. They view solidarity not as a cultural value or feeling (although these might be involved in certain types of solidary relations) but as an objective attribute of a social system. The degree of solidarity in a social system is seen by both as a function of those ties between individuals and groups that enable interests to be served in a manner that transcends the ties between the individuals and groups involved. Serving the common good is not equal to solidarity itself but a possible result of social solidarity. This assertion implies, first, that in a social system with strong solidarity collective interests can be served and realised more easily and in greater measure than in a social system with weaker solidarity. Second, broader or more extended solidarity means that more interests can be recognised and accepted as being collective (i.e. perceived as the responsibility of all), or that the collectivity is defined more broadly (for example, the evolution from early local and charitable poor relief systems to comprehensive national income protection systems is a manifestation of social solidarity being extended in both respects). The main source

[1] Weber's point here corresponds with Marx's well known dichotomy of *Klasse an Sich* and *Klasse für Sich*.

of solidarity is a mutual sharing of each other's fate. This sharing may be of two types; either people share their fate because they identify with one another: there is a feeling of 'we are one', which means that 'your interest is my interest is our interest'. Or people share fates because they depend on each other for realising life opportunities: there is a perception of 'we need each other'. The first type, which we will call *shared identity*, is a culturally and emphatically based bond, to which Durkheim's 'conscience collective' refers at the macro level and Weber's communal relationship at the micro level. The second type, *shared utility*, is a structurally based bond, to which Durkheim's concept of organic solidarity refers at the macro level and Weber's associative relationship at the micro level.We learn from Durkheim and Weber that a social system's measure of solidarity, and thus the possibility of realising collective interests, is higher the more people and groups involved identify with one another and the more they depend on one another.

Institutionalised role obligations

Parsons' view of solidarity ties in with the ideas of Durkheim and Weber in that, according to Parsons, collective interests take precedence over individual interests. In the context of his general theory of action Parsons identifies and analyses different types of action. Solidary action is defined as collectivity-oriented action, which contrasts with self-oriented action (Parsons, 1951: 97-101). The first type of action is explicitly aimed at the interests and coherence of a group or a wider social system, while the second has no such orientation. Solidary behaviour is described briefly by Parsons as '*...taking responsibility as a member of the collectivity*' (p.99). Such a step involves more than just being loyal to the group or the system. Loyalty is collectivity-oriented behaviour based on voluntariness. Parsons sees loyalty as the uninstitutionalised precursor of solidarity, whereas the essence of solidary behaviour is that it derives from and conforms to institutionalised role obligations.

According to Parsons, social ties are construed at the meso level (i.e. within institutions or 'collectivities'). All institutions impose moral obligations to contribute to its collective interests on those individuals who figure in their operations. Such obligations exist for each and every institutional role. Solidary behaviour means that one conforms to the solidarity obligations of one□s role. The actual degree to which a collectivity can have its interests served by its members (i.e. the de facto internal level of solidarity) is thus a function of the degree to which the collectivity succeeds in imposing solidarity obligations on its members.

Parsons locates solidarity at the meso level of institutional roles, while Durkheim analysed it at the macro level and Weber at the micro level. Like Durkheim, Parsons states explicitly that solidarity implies a certain coercion of the individuals involved. Durkheim stresses that individuals in a modern society have to conform to rules for co-operation, whereas Parsons emphasises that in any institution individuals are expected to conform to solidarity obligations. Thus, the criticism of some (e.g. Tromp 1985) that solidaristic behaviour within the modern welfare state is mainly enforced and therefore attests to a weak or deficient solidarity base does not hold. From a sociological point of view a certain degree of coercion is inherent in social solidarity.

Emotional ties and shared identity

Mayhew's theory of solidarity elaborates on the notion that we have called 'shared identity' here. He situates the fundamental base for social bonds in human emotional ties which are present in direct, repeated face-to-face relations between individuals (Mayhew 1971). In interactions with others, patterns and networks of attraction and loyalty arise. As a result of such patterns, individuals start defining themselves as members of a broader unified group whose integrity and interests have to be defended. In this stage individuals perceive a certain collective identity and collective interests. Once they have established a sense of fellowship and membership, people will become willing to co-operate toward realising the common good. At that point the collectivity turns into what Mayhew calls a system of solidarity: such a degree of identity-sharing has been achieved that serving the collective interest as a co-ordinated action by group members becomes possible. Mayhew sees complex societies as conglomerations of systems of solidarity. To the degree that such systems grow more dependent on one another (as a result of the division of labour and specialisation), they will have to form associative relations aimed at co-operation and exchange. The conglomerative bonds that arise and develop are less intense, more abstract and cover a broader geographic and cultural scope than the bonds within the systems of solidarity themselves. According to Mayhew, such broader bonds are crucial for the existence of complex societies.

Mayhew locates a deeper basis for the identity-based solidarity than Durkheim. This level is not that of shared cultural elements in a collective conscience, since such a conscience presupposes that systems of solidarity have already been established (i.e. that human emotional ties have already resulted in patterns of attraction and loyalty and in group formation). Also, Mayhew's solidarity base is more specific than Weber's communal relationship. It is limited to the emotional, affective bond between people, while Weber considered the possibility of traditional bases as well. A traditional base for fellow feeling, however, like Durkheim's conscience collective, presupposes that a system of solidarity already exists. Mayhew and Durkheim both distinguish between solidarity from a shared identity and solidarity from a shared utility. Durkheim analyses them from a perspective of societal modernisation: shared identity as the core of pre-modern mechanic solidarity and shared utility as the core of modern organic solidarity. Mayhew, however, analyses both sources of solidarity primarily from a perspective of the simple versus the complex. In reality, modern societies are more complex than pre-modern ones, but Mayhew's theory enables us to study solidarity in more or less complex systems and conglomerations within any type of society, modern or pre-modern.

Interdependency and shared utility

Instead of deducing solidarity from a shared identity, Hechter (1987)views solidarity as derived from shared utility. His theory on the principles of group solidarity is based on the idea that individuals rely on each other (i.e. the group) to satisfy their needs. Groups, however, can function only if their members contribute. Therefore, individuals are just as dependent on the group's production as the group is on contributions from its members. Hechter's sociological theory on solidarity concerns the conditions and the mechanisms enabling groups to motivate their members to contribute to the common good.

The least complex possibility in this respect is a situation in which the group can exchange part of it's production for specified amounts and types of contributions. Members contributing to the group's interests and activities receive a proportionate or otherwise fair share of the group's production in return; those who do not contribute receive less or nothing. With collective goods (which no group member can be excluded from consumption), however, free-riding and thus sub-optimal production have traditionally been a problem. Hechter does not agree with Durkheim's and Parsons' solution to this problem, which holds that individuals may be motivated to contribute to the production of such goods from a moral conviction or out of a moral obligation. It will always remain obscure whether people act out of moral obligation or for fear of sanctions. More basically, Hechter argues that such normative solutions do not explain why solidarity in one group is stronger than in another (i.e. why people would regard their moral obligations towards one group as more important than towards another group). While norms may be critical in such differences, the normative theories do not reveal people's motives and extent of adherence to them. The mere existence of obligations to contribute does not necessarily mean that they will be met. Crucial to Hechter, then, is not only the extensiveness of obligations to contribute to the common good, but also the degree to which individual members actually comply with these obligations. Compliance will be greater, and thus the degree of solidarity higher, depending on the extent of: (1) individual dependency on the revenues of the production of the collective good; (2) effectiveness of control of contributions. Hechter submits that these two basic variables not only explain differences in the actual degree of solidarity between social systems but also reveal why under certain conditions some individuals exhibit greater solidarity than others. The theory can be refined empirically by specifying factors which influence these two variables. The degree to which individual members depend on the production of the common good of the group they belong to depends for instance on whether there are alternatives available and on the costs involved in moving to another group. The control capacity depends on the visibility of contributions, the costs of control, the availability of sanctions etc.

Conclusions

First, the sociologists discussed so far seem to perceive solidarity as a state of relations between individuals and groups enabling collective interests to be served. The essence of and basis for such relations is that people have or experience a common fate, either because they share identity as members of the same collectivity and therefore feel a mutual sense of belonging and responsibility, or because they share utility: they need each other to realise their life opportunities. The scope and strength of solidarity in a social system is a function of such shared identities and utilities. Solidaristic behaviour boils down to acting in the interest of the group and its members.

Second, sociological views on what it is that ties individuals to collectivities seem to be based on combinations of two different conceptions of the individual. On the one hand there is the conception of the *homo sociologicus*, in which individuals are seen as essentially social beings, who act in accordance with their affections for others and internalised cultural norms and values. In the conception of *homo sociologicus*, ties with others are taken for granted and contributing to the common good regarded as an

inherently legitimate demand from the collectivity, since for the *homo sociologicus* a basic (though not necessarily complete) overlap exists between the personal and the collective interest. On the other hand, there is the conception of *homo economicus*, which sees individuals essentially as non-social beings, who act in accordance with their perceived self-interest and try to maximise personal utility in their relations with others. The *homo economicus* will not engage spontaneously in social ties and contribute to the common good, but will do so only if such action is sufficiently profitable, or if (s)he is forced to do so.

Third, the sociologists discussed clearly do not perceive solidarity as a sentiment of people, although something like a sentiment of solidarity exists. This refers to a wish to share other peoples' fate and to promote the interest of the (thus defined) collectivity of *ego* and *alter*. Such sentiments are not critical for the actual existence of solidarity, because people can have other types of motives to contribute to the common good. The legitimacy of interpersonal and intergroup relations, role obligations and arrangements aimed at serving collective interests, depends on the degree to which people have such motives. The important question arising now is what types of motive individuals can have to accept and support solidarity?

3. Motives for solidarity

The previous sections enable identification of four specifications of what motivates *homo sociologicus* and *homo economicus*. Mayhew, for instance, stresses mainly the role of people's feelings and sentiments, that is, affective and emotional grounds for solidarity. The degree to which people feel attracted to one another and are loyal at the micro level, and the degree to which they perceive a collective identity and we-feeling at the meso and macro level are decisive for the solidarity between them.

The second motive for solidarity, distilled from the theories of Durkheim and Parsons, depends on culturally-based convictions, which imply that the individual feels a moral obligation to serve the collective interest and to accept existing relations of solidarity. Like the affective and emotional motive for solidarity, the strength of this motive may vary. The shared 'conscience collective' may contain fewer or more moral codes for co-operation; institutional role obligations can vary in number and strength; codes and obligations can be strongly or weakly internalised etcetera.

Long term self-interest can be a third motive for solidarity. It is central in Hechter's rational choice based approach and underlies Durkheim's organic solidarity in a modern differentiated society, where people learn that they benefit from contributing to the collective interest (if not immediately then in the long run). The motive is also the basis for Weber's associative relationship, in which people agree to help one another, either by exchanging goods or services or by co-operating to achieve a common goal. In other words, solidary behaviour, or contributing to the common good, can be motivated by an individual's perception that such a contribution is rewarded, here and now or may be in the future. This type of motive is present for instance, among those who pay their contributions to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, not because they sympathise and identify so strongly with the elderly as a needy group, or because they regard it as a moral duty attached to their role of a working citizen, but mainly because they hope to become

65 themselves and benefit from the system in the future. So, solidarity does not need to be grounded in warm feelings of love and duty; it can be based on a rational calculation. Those scholars who argue that the legitimacy of the modern welfare state mainly stems from the fact that the middle and higher classes profit most from it, implicitly refer to this type of motive (see e.g. Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin and LeGrand, 1987).

Fourth, support for solidarity is not necessarily spontaneous, or completely voluntary. According to Parsons, this condition should not be taken for granted, as contributing to the collective interest is an act of solidarity only if it results from institutional role obligations. Purely voluntary contributions do not bind; they are merely manifestations of loyalty and lack true commitment. In Hechter's theory on solidarity, enforcement figures even more explicitly. Free- riding necessitates coercion to and control of contributions to the common good. Empirically, one can imagine situations in which the first three motives – affection and identification, moral conviction, self-interest - fail to provide sufficient support for solidarity. For instance, the identification with other group members may be low, moral obligations may be perceived as unrealistic or unjust, and people may not have or perceive a strong personal interest in the group's revenues. In such cases solidarity will not be supported spontaneously, making enforcement by a higher authority necessary. This can be the group, the neighbourhood or the public exercising social control, but in many fields of modern society it will be the state. It has to be remarked, though, that enforced solidarity can only be stable in the long run if it is legitimised. Of course it can be legitimised by the motives mentioned earlier, but we discuss here a situation in which they are not sufficiently strong. The remaining possibility is that the authority has a legitimacy of itself, be it a 'legal-bureaucratic', 'traditional' or 'charismatic' legitimacy (Weber in Henderson and Parsons, 1964: 130). For instance, obligations to behave solidary, installed upon citizens by the state, can be perceived as legitimate because the state is itself seen as a legitimate authority.

To conclude, four different motives for solidarity can be distinguished: 1) mutual affection and identification, 2) moral convictions, 3) perceived self-interest and 4) accepted authority. While the four motives are not mutually exclusive, their respective roles in different situations may vary, depending, for instance, on type of personality, type of social relation and type of collectivity. Support for solidarity relations will generally be stronger to the degree that: (1) such relations link up with existing patterns of mutual affections and identification; (2) they correspond with relevant moral convictions and perceived duties being in force; (3) they correspond to the (long term) self-interest of individuals and groups involved, and; (4) to the degree that they are backed by a more legitimate authoritive body. Solidary relations and arrangements that are legitimate on the grounds of all four motives, however, are likely to be the strongest.

If we regard solidaristic welfare arrangements and institutions as serving the collective interest of a society then the foregoing analyses offers the possibility of measuring and analysing the legitimacy of welfare solidarity. Such legitimacy is stronger to the degree that (1) more people are motivated to contribute to the arrangements, e.g. by means of paying taxes and premiums, and (2) people have more different motives to contribute. A

measurement of solidarity legitimacy would be to ask people about their possible motivations for contributing to specific solidaristic arrangements. Just to illustrate such an approach we present some data of the TISSER Solidarity study, a national representative survey among the Dutch public from 1995 (N=1500). In this survey people were asked what their motives were for paying contributions to the national, collective and solidaristic social security system, apart from the fact that it is a legal obligation. Table 1 shows their answers.

Table 1 Why pay social security contributions?

Paying contributions is a legal obligation, but I also do it because...	(strongly) agree	middle	(strongly) disagree	don't know
...it assures me of a benefit in case I need one myself	82	10	3	5
...it is a moral duty with regard to the needy in society	64	23	8	6
...I personally feel with the lot of beneficiaries	42	38	14	6

A first conclusion is that a large majority of the Dutch public regards motives other than the fact that it is obligatory as important reasons for paying contributions. Therefore, the enforced character of the contributions is not seen by many of the Dutch as a major burden. On the contrary, the enforced solidarity is accepted by a large majority of 82% on grounds of a perceived self-interest. The moral motive, that paying contributions is a duty with regard to the needy in society, is given by fewer people, but still by a majority of nearly two-thirds (64%). The affective motive, feeling with the lot of beneficiaries, is the least strong. Given the abstract and complex character of the social security system this could be expected. Nevertheless, the motive is given by as much as 42% of the Dutch. Generally, the table shows that the Dutch solidaristic social security system has a strong legitimation base among the public. Many people are motivated to pay, and many are motivated on different grounds. The table also shows that, in the Dutch case at least, the hypothesis that welfare state legitimacy depends on the degree that the broad middle classes perceive to profit from it (see e.g. Baldwin 1990, Esping Andersen 1990) is supported by the facts. Further analyses of the data contained by the table revealed many interesting patterns along social division variables as income, educational level age and type of household (see Van Oorschot 1997b).

The table 1 is just an illustration. The same type of questions could be asked with regard to different types of benefits (assistance vs. insurance, different social risks etc.), different spheres of welfare (income protection, (health)care, housing, ageing, education), and questions could be asked in different countries. In the longer run the lack of a strong societal resistance against 'the new conditionality' of European welfare states might be understood from measuring the degree and types of motivation the European public has to contribute to differently targeted and institutionalised types of welfare.

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Work and Organization Research Centre
Warandelaan 2, P.O. Box 90153
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